McIntosh v. United States Petitioner Louis McIntosh was indicted on multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses. The indictment set forth the demand that McIntosh “shall forfeit . . . all property . . . derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the [Hobbs Act] offenses.” The Government also later provided McIntosh with a pretrial bill of particulars that included as property subject to forfeiture $75,000 in cash and a BMW that McIntosh purchased just five days after one of the robberies. After a jury convicted McIntosh, the District Court imposed a forfeiture of $75,000 and the BMW at the sentencing hearing. Although the District Court also ordered the Government to submit an order of forfeiture for the court’s signature within a week from the hearing, the Government failed to do so. On appeal, the Government moved for a limited remand to supplement the record with a written order of forfeiture. The Second Circuit granted the unopposed motion. Back in District Court, McIntosh argued that the failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)—which provides that “[u]nless doing so is impractical,” a federal district court “must enter the preliminary order [of forfeiture] sufficiently in advance of sentencing to allow the parties to suggest revisions or modifications before the order becomes final as to the defendant”—meant that the District Court could not proceed with forfeiture at all. The District Court overruled McIntosh’s objections, finding that the Rule is a timerelated directive, and that the failure to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before sentencing did not prevent the court from ordering forfeiture because the missed deadline did not prejudice McIntosh. The Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Held: A district court’s failure to comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s requirement to enter a preliminary order before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review. (a) Although the District Court did not comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) when it failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before McIntosh’s initial sentencing, the District Court retained its power to order forfeiture against McIntosh. (b) McIntosh’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. He points to he Rule’s use of the word “must” to highlight its mandatory character, but such language standing “alone has not always led this Court to interpret statutes to bar judges . . . from taking action to which a missed statutory deadline refers.” (c) Noncompliance with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is a procedural error subject to harmlessness review. Because McIntosh did not challenge the lower courts’ harmlessness analysis in either his certiorari petition or his opening brief, this Court need not revisit it. P. 13. Read by Founder RJ Dieken

Petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the United States Army in 2000 and served a total of eight years over three separate periods of military service. He became entitled to Montgomery Bill benefits as a result of his first period of service. Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree and used 25 months and 14 days of Montgomery benefits to finance his education. Through his subsequent periods of service, Rudisill also became entitled to more generous educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits to finance a graduate degree. Rudisill understood that such benefits would be limited to 22 months and 16 days under §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. But the Government informed Rudisill that he was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits (the length of his unused Montgomery benefits) due to §3327, a provision in the Post-9/11 Bill designed to coordinate benefits for those servicemembers meeting the criteria for both Montgomery benefits and Post-9/11 benefits. Section 3327 provides that a servicemember meeting the criteria for both GI bills can elect to swap Montgomery benefits for the more generous Post-9/11 benefits, up to a total of 36 months of benefits. §3327(d)(2)(A). Ultimately, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, sided with the Government, explaining that when Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits, he had made an “election” under §3327(a)(1) to swap his Montgomery benefits for Post 9/11 benefits, making his benefits subject to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month limit. Held: Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to §3695(a)’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. Pp. 8–18. (a) The Government claims that someone in Rudisill’s position is subject to §3322(d)’s mandatory coordination clause, so, to receive any Post-9/11 benefits, he must make an election under §3327(a), which in turn subjects him to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month benefit limit. Rudisill counters that §3322(d) does not apply to him because he has earned two separate entitlements to benefits. Rudisill further maintains that §3327(a)’s election mechanism is optional in any event, and that he does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make a §3327(a) election. The statutory text resolves this case in Rudisill’s favor. (b) Section 3322(d), which creates a mechanism for certain servicemembers to “coordinate” their benefits, does not limit Rudisill’s entitlement. First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefits. Section 3322(d) does not mention the receipt of benefits but addresses instead the “coordination of entitlement.” Because Rudisill is already entitled to two separate benefits, he has no need to coordinate any entitlement under §3327. As used in the statute, the word “coordination” denotes a swap. Section 3327, to which §3322(d) points, describes coordination as making an election that permits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefits “instead of” Montgomery benefits. §3327(d)(1). (c) The contention that Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits by invoking §3327 is contradicted by that provision’s text. Reversed and remanded. JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BARRETT, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. Read by Jeff Barnum.

DEVILLIER v. TEXAS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Argued Jan. 16, 2024—Decided Apr. 16, 2024 Richard DeVillier and more than 120 other petitioners own property north of U. S. Interstate Highway 10 between Houston and Beaumont, Texas. The dispute here arose after the State of Texas took action to use portions of I–10 as a flood evacuation route, installing a roughly 3- foot-tall barrier along the highway median to act as a dam. When subsequent hurricanes and storms brought heavy rainfall, the median barrier performed as intended, keeping the south side of the highway open. But it also flooded petitioners’ land to the north, causing significant damage to their property. DeVillier filed suit in Texas state court. He alleged that by building the median barrier and using his property to store stormwater, Texas had effected a taking of his property for which the State must pay just compensation. Other property owners filed similar suits. Texas removed the cases to federal court, where they were consolidated into a single proceeding with one operative complaint. The operative complaint includes inverse condemnation claims under both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As relevant, Texas moved to dismiss the federal inverse-condemnation claim, arguing that a plaintiff has no cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. The District Court denied Texas’ motion, concluding that a property owner may sue a State directly under the Takings Clause. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding “that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.” 53 F. 4th 904 (per curiam). Held: DeVillier and the other property owners should be permitted to pursue their claims under the Takings Clause through the cause of action available under Texas law. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Court has explained that “a property owner acquires an irrevocable right to just compensation immediately upon a taking” “[b]ecause of ‘the self-executing character’ of the Takings Clause ‘with respect to compensation.’ ” Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 192 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 315). The question here concerns the procedural vehicle by which a property owner may seek to vindicate that right. Constitutional rights do not typically come with a built-in cause of action to allow for private enforcement in courts, see Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 490–491, and so they are asserted offensively pursuant to an independent cause of action designed for that purpose, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §1983. DeVillier relies on First English and other cases to argue that the Takings Clause creates by its own force a cause of action authorizing suits for just compensation. But those cases do not directly confront whether the Takings Clause provides a cause of action. It would be imprudent to decide that question without first establishing the premise in the question presented that no other cause of action exists to vindicate the property owner’s rights under the Takings Clause. Texas state law does provide an inverse-condemnation cause of action by which property owners may seek just compensation against the State based on both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause. This case therefore does not present the circumstance in which a property owner has no cause of action to seek just compensation. The Court therefore remands so that DeVillier and the other property owners may proceed through the cause of action available under Texas law. 53 F. 4th 904, vacated and remanded. THOMAS, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

George Sheetz was required by the County of El Dorado to pay $23,420 George Sheetz tried to get a residential building permit from El Dorado County. To do so, the County made him pay a $23,420 "traffic impact fee." The fee was part of the County's "General Plan" -- this plan was intended to address the impact that development has on public services. This fee was calculated based on a standard schedule, rather than any actual impact resulting from his development. Sheetz paid the fee under protest. He sued in state court, claiming that the fee amounted to an "exaction" that violated the Takings Clause. Sheetz argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, require the County to make an individualized determination. The County argued that these cases only apply to individual decisions by administrators, but not by legislative bodies. Held: The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions. a) The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay "just compensation" when property is taken. This Clause also stands for the notion that public costs should be paid by the public, not individual people. Yet, States do have substantial authority to generally regulate land use. Land use regulations are generally acceptable so long as they are “reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose” -- so long as it does not take too much value or frustrate the investment backed expectations of the owner. The government may also deny a building permit within its police power purpose when the ends match it. The government can prevent development if it is related to the issues (i.e. giving land to widen a road when congestion will be increased), but this needs to be related to the government interest, otherwise, it amounts to extortion. To be constitutional, permit conditions must have an 1) essential nexus to the government interest; and 2) must have rough proportionality to the public use. b) The decisions below upheld the traffic impact fee because they reasoned that Nolan and Dolan do not apply to legislative fees (but instead, only administrative), nothing in the constitutional text or history suggests this reading. There is no reason why the Nolan and Dolan tests should not apply to legislation, but only to administrative actions. c) Building permit conditions are not exempt from Nolan or Dolan scrutiny only because they were imposed by a legislative body. Vacated and remanded. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor filed a concurrence, which was joined by Jackson. Gorsuch filed a concurrence. Kavanaugh filed a concurrence, in which Kagan and Jackson joined.

Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation owns a subsidiary that operates terminals to store bulk liquid commodities, including No. 6 fuel oil, which has almost 3% sulfer. The UN adopted IMO in 2016, which set in in 2020. This regulation capped the sulfur content on fuel oil used in shipping to 0.5%. Macquarie did not discuss this IMO in its public documents, but in February 2018, its stock fell 41% after announcing that it lost contracts in of its subsidiary. Moab partners sued for violating SEC Rule 10b-5(b) - failure to omit material facts about securities. The trial court dismissed the complaint, the Second Circuit reversed because of its duty to disclose. Held: Pure omissions are not actionable under Rule 10b–5(b). Rule 10b– 5(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” In addition to prohibiting “any untrue statement of a material fact”—i.e., false statements or lies—the Rule also prohibits omitting a material fact necessary “to make the statements made . . . not misleading.” Ibid. This case turns on whether this second prohibition bars only half-truths or instead extends to pure omissions. A pure omission occurs when a speaker says nothing, in circumstances that do not give any special significance to that silence. Halftruths, on the other hand, are “representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information.” Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U. S. 176, 188. Rule 10b–5(b) requires disclosure of information necessary to ensure that statements already made are clear and complete. Logically and by its plain text, Rule 10b–5(b) therefore covers halftruths, not pure omissions, because it requires identifying affirmative assertions (i.e., “statements made”) before determining if other facts are needed to make those statements “not misleading.” Statutory context confirms what the text plainly provides. Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits any registration statement that “omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein.” 15 U. S. C. §77k(a). By its terms, §11(a) creates liability for failure to speak. Neither §10(b) nor Rule 10b–5(b) contains language similar to §11(a), and that omission is telling. “Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b–5.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson,. A duty to disclose, however, does not automatically render silence misleading under Rule 10b–5(b). The failure to disclose information required by Item 303 can support a Rule 10b–5(b) claim only if the omission renders affirmative statements made misleading. Moab and the United States suggest that a plaintiff does not need to plead any statements rendered misleading by a pure omission because reasonable investors know that the Exchange Act requires issuers to file periodic informational statements in which companies must furnish the information required by Item 303. But that argument reads the words “statements made” out of Rule 10b–5(b) and shifts the focus of that Rule and §10(b) from fraud to disclosure. See Chiarella v. United States, (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud”). Moab also contends that without private liability for pure omissions under Rule 10b–5(b), there will be “broad immunity any time an issuer fraudulently omits information Congress and the SEC require it to disclose.” But private parties remain free to bring claims based on Item 303 violations that create misleading half-truths, and the SEC retains authority to prosecute violations of its own rules and regulations, including Item 303. Vacated and remanded. SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Read by Jeff Barnum.

Flowers makes baked goods that are then distributed across the country. Bissonnette owned the distribution rights in a certain part of the country. Their contract subjected them to the F.A.A.. After Bissonnette sued under Labor (wage) laws, Flowers moved to compel arbitration. Bissonnette said they're exempt because the F.A.A. exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The District Court dismissed the case, sending it to Arbitration. The Second City affirmed, finding that the exemption only applied to workers in the transportation industry, but these were workers in the bakery industry. Held: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under §1 of the FAA. (a) The Court has long recognized that the exemption in §1 is limited to transportation workers. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. Applying the ejusdem generis canon of statutory interpretation to §1, the Court in Circuit City read the general phrase “class of workers engaged in . . . commerce” to be “controlled and defined by reference to” the specific categories “seamen” and “railroad employees” that precede it. The Court concluded that the “linkage” between “seamen” and “railroad employees” is that they are both transportation workers, and the Court thus interpreted the class of workers in the residual clause of §1 to be limited in the same way. The Court again considered the scope of the residual clause in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon and declined to adopt an industrywide approach to §1, rejecting the employee’s claim that she was a member of a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” simply because she worked for an airline and carried out its customary work. Instead, the language of §1—referring to “ ‘workers’ ” who are “engaged” in commerce—focuses on the performance of work rather than the industry of the employer. The relevant question was what the employee does at the airline, not what the airline does generally. Saxon. Here the Second Circuit fashioned its transportation-industry requirement without any guide in the text of §1 or this Court’s precedents. The Second Circuit decided that an entity would be considered within the transportation industry if it “pegs its charges chiefly to the movement of goods or passengers” and its “predominant source of commercial revenue is generated by that movement.” But that test would often turn on arcane riddles about the nature of a company’s services. For example, does a pizza delivery company derive its revenue mainly from pizza or delivery? Extensive discovery might be necessary before deciding a motion to compel arbitration, adding expense and delay to every FAA case. That “complexity and uncertainty” would “‘breed[] litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it.’ ” (b) Flowers argues that the §1 exemption would sweep too broadly without an implied transportation-industry requirement. Because “virtually all products move in interstate commerce,” Flowers warns that nearly all workers who load or unload goods would be exempt from arbitration. But §1 does not define the class of exempt workers in such limitless terms. Instead, as the Court held in Saxon, a transportation worker is one who is “actively” “ ‘engaged in transportation’ of . . . goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” In other words, a transportation worker “must at least play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders.” 596 U. S., at 458. These requirements “undermine[] any attempt to give the provision a sweeping, open-ended construction,” instead limiting §1 to its appropriately “narrow” scope. Id., vacated and remanded.

Respondent Yonas Fikre, a U. S. citizen and Sudanese emigree, brought suit alleging that the government placed him on the No Fly List unlawfully. In his complaint, Mr. Fikre alleged that he traveled from his home in Portland, Oregon to Sudan in 2009 to pursue business opportunities there. At a visit to the U. S. embassy, two FBI agents informed Mr. Fikre that he could not return to the United States because the government had placed him on the No Fly List. The agents questioned him extensively about the Portland mosque he attended, and they offered to take steps to remove him from the No Fly List if he agreed to become an FBI informant and to report on other members of his religious community. Mr. Fikre refused. He then traveled to the United Arab Emirates, where he alleges authorities interrogated and detained him for 106 days at the behest of the FBI. Unable to fly back to the United States, he ended up in Sweden, where he remained until February 2015. While there, he filed this suit, alleging that the government had violated his rights to procedural due process by failing to provide either meaningful notice of his addition to the No Fly List or any appropriate way to secure redress. He further alleged that the government had placed him on the list for constitutionally impermissible reasons related to his race, national origin, and religious beliefs. Mr. Fikre sought, among other things, an injunction prohibiting the government from keeping him on the No Fly List and a declaratory judgment confirming the government had violated his rights. In May 2016, the government notified Mr. Fikre that he had been removed from the No Fly List and sought dismissal of his suit in district court, arguing that its administrative action had rendered the case moot. The district court agreed with the government, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a party seeking to moot a case based on its own voluntary cessation of challenged conduct must show that the conduct cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” 904 F. 3d 1033, 1039. On remand, the government submitted a declaration asserting that, based on the currently available information, Mr. Fikre would not be placed on the No Fly List in the future, and the district court again dismissed Mr. Fikre’s claim as moot. The Ninth Circuit once again reversed, holding that the government had failed to meet its burden because the declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Mr. Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. 35 F. 4th 762, 770–772. Held: The government has failed to demonstrate that this case is moot. A court with jurisdiction has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear and resolve questions properly before it. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976). But the converse is also true as a federal court must dismiss a case that is moot. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 91 (2013). The limited authority vested in federal courts by Article III of the U. S. Constitution to decide cases and controversies means that federal courts may no more pronounce on past actions that have no “continuing effect” in the world than they may neglect their obligation to hear and resolve questions properly before them. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18. This does not imply that a defendant may “automatically moot a case” by the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it is sued. Instead, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation of a challenged practice” will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189.

Wilkinson v. Garland Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the removal of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ must decide first whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ finds the noncitizen statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discretion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enumerated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen to “establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [the noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child,” who is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §1229b(b)(1)(D). Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United States beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. Wilkinson applied for cancellation of removal based in part on hardship to his 7-year-old, U. S.-born son, M., who suffers from a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson for emotional and financial support. To meet the hardship standard, Wilkinson had to show that M. “would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from [his] removal.” In re MonrealAguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62. Considering all of the hardship factors presented by Wilkinson in the aggregate, the IJ held that M.’s situation did not meet the statutory standard for “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship and denied Wilkinson’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit held that it lacked the jurisdiction necessary to review the IJ’s discretionary hardship determination. This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the IJ’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship determination is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) or whether that determination is discretionary and therefore unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Held: The Third Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s determination in this case. Pp. 7–16. Read by Jake Leahy.

O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier In 2014, Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T. J. Zane created public Facebook pages to promote their campaigns for election to the Poway Unified School District (PUSD) Board of Trustees. While O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane (whom we will call the Trustees) both had personal Facebook pages that they shared with friends and family, they used their public pages for campaigning and issues related to PUSD. After they won election, the Trustees continued to use their public pages to post PUSD-related content, including board-meeting recaps, application solicitations for board positions, local budget plans and surveys, and public safety updates. They also used their pages to solicit feedback and communicate with constituents. Their Facebook pages described them as “Government Official[s]” and noted their official positions. O’Connor-Ratcliff also created a public Twitter page, which she used in much the same way. Christopher and Kimberly Garnier, who have children attending PUSD schools, often criticized the board of trustees. They began posting lengthy and repetitive comments on the Trustees’ social-media posts—for instance, nearly identical comments on 42 separate posts on O’Connor-Ratcliff ’s Facebook page and 226 identical replies within a 10-minute span to every tweet on her Twitter feed. The Trustees initially deleted the Garniers’ comments before blocking them from commenting altogether. The Garniers sued the Trustees under 42 U. S. C. §1983, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged violation of their First Amendment rights. At summary judgment, the District Court granted the Trustees qualified immunity as to the damages claims but allowed the case to proceed on the merits on the ground that the Trustees acted “under color of ” state law when they blocked the Garniers. §1983. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that §1983’s stateaction requirement was satisfied because there was a “close nexus between the Trustees’ use of their social media pages and their official positions.” 41 F. 4th 1158, 1170 (2022). The court cited its own state-action precedent, which holds that an off-duty state employee acts under color of law if she (1) “purports to or pretends to act under color of law”; (2) her “pretense of acting in the performance of [her] duties had the purpose and effect of influencing the behavior of others”; and (3) the “harm inflicted on plaintiff related in some meaningful way either to the officer’s governmental status or to the performance of [her] duties.” Ibid. (citing Naffe v. Frey, 789 F. 3d 1030, 1037 (CA9 2015); internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Applying that framework, the court found state action based largely on the official “appearance and content” of the Trustees’ pages. 41 F. 4th, at 1171. We granted certiorari in this case and in Lindke v. Freed, ___ U. S. ___ (2024), to resolve a Circuit split about how to identify state action in the context of public officials using social media. 598 U. S. ___ (2023). Because the approach that the Ninth Circuit applied is different from the one we have elaborated in Lindke, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in that case. It is so ordered. Read by Jeff Barnum.

James Freed, like countless other Americans, created a private Facebook profile sometime before 2008. He eventually converted his profile to a public “page,” meaning that anyone could see and comment on his posts. In 2014, Freed updated his Facebook page to reflect that he was appointed city manager of Port Huron, Michigan, describing himself as “Daddy to Lucy, Husband to Jessie and City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed continued to operate his Facebook page himself and continued to post prolifically (and primarily) about his personal life. Freed also posted information related to his job, such as highlighting communications from other city officials and soliciting feedback from the public on issues of concern. Freed often responded to comments on his posts, including those left by city residents with inquiries about community matters. He occasionally deleted comments that he considered “derogatory” or “stupid.” After the COVID–19 pandemic began, Freed posted about it. Some posts were personal, and some contained information related to his job. Facebook user Kevin Lindke commented on some of Freed’s posts, unequivocally expressing his displeasure with the city’s approach to the pandemic. Initially, Freed deleted Lindke’s comments; ultimately, he blocked him from commenting at all. Lindke sued Freed under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that Freed had violated his First Amendment rights. As Lindke saw it, he had the right to comment on Freed’s Facebook page because it was a public forum. The District Court determined that because Freed managed his Facebook page in his private capacity, and because only state action can give rise to liability under §1983, Lindke’s claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Held: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official’s social-media page engages in state action under §1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts. Pp. 5–15. BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Read by Jeff Barnum.

PULSIFER v. UNITED STATES No. 22–340. Argued October 2, 2023—Decided March 15, 2024 After pleading guilty to distributing at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, petitioner Mark Pulsifer faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. At sentencing, he sought to take advantage of the “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law, which allows a sentencing court to disregard the statutory minimum if a defendant meets five criteria. Among those is the requirement, set out in Paragraph (f)(1), that the sentencing court find that— (1) the defendant does not have— (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines. The Government argued that Pulsifer could not satisfy that requirement because he had two prior three-point offenses totaling six criminal-history points. In the Government’s view, each of those prior offenses disqualified him under Subparagraph B and the six total points disqualified him under Subparagraph A. But Pulsifer claimed he remained eligible. He pointed out that his criminal record lacked a two-point violent offense, as specified in Subparagraph C. And in his view, only the combination of the items listed in the subparagraphs could prevent him from getting safety-valve relief. The District Court agreed with the Government, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Held: A defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U. S. C. §3553(f)(1) only if he satisfies each of the provision’s three conditions—or said more specifically, only if he does not have more than four criminal-history points, does not have a prior three-point offense, and does not have a prior two-point violent offense. Pp. 6–28. Read by Jeff Barnum

Trump v. Anderson A group of Colorado voters contends that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year’s election, from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secretary of state to exclude the former President from the Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him. Former President Trump challenges that decision on several grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, we reverse. Read by Jake Leahy.

Trump v. Anderson DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO [March 4, 2024] JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I and II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presidential candidates. That principle is sufficient to resolve this case, and I would decide no more than that. This suit was brought by Colorado voters under state law in state court. It does not require us to address the complicated question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced. The majority’s choice of a different path leaves the remaining Justices with a choice of how to respond. In my judgment, this is not the time to amplify disagreement with stridency. The Court has settled a politically charged issue in the volatile season of a Presidential election. Particularly in this circumstance, writings on the Court should turn the national temperature down, not up. For present purposes, our differences are far less important than our unanimity: All nine Justices agree on the outcome of this case. That is the message Americans should take home. Read by RJ Dieken.

Trump v. Anderson JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. "“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamental principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized “to say what the law is” only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases . . . must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, deciding not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colorado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation’s federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though “[a]ll nine Members of the Court” agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case, five Justices go on. They decide novel constitutional questions to insulate this Court and petitioner from future controversy. Ante, at 13. Although only an individual State’s action is at issue here, the majority opines on which federal actors can enforce Section 3, and how they must do so. The majority announces that a disqualification for insurrection can occur only when Congress enacts a particular kind of legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the majority shuts the door on other potential means of federal enforcement. We cannot join an opinion that decides momentous and difficult issues unnecessarily, and we therefore concur only in the judgment." Read by Jeff Barnum.

MCELRATH v. GEORGIA Damian McElrath was charged with malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault -- all related to the death of his mother. A jury returned a split verdict. For the malice-murder charge, finding him “not guilty by reason of insanity” and “guilty but mentally ill” to the other counts. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that because these findings were inconsistent by finding different mental states, he should be retried under the Georgia "repugnant" doctrine. McElrath argued he could not be re-tried because of the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. "Held: The jury’s verdict that McElrath was not guilty of malice murder by reason of insanity constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury’s other verdicts. (a) The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 5th Amendment. “[I]t has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and . . . is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence.” Green v. United States. The Court’s “cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v. Michigan. Once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate. The principle “that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise,’ ” is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.. Whatever the basis for a jury’s verdict, see Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal. (b) Georgia law specifically provides that a defendant who establishes an insanity defense “shall not be found guilty of [the] crime.” Ga. Code. Here, the jury concluded that McElrath was not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the malice-murder charge. That verdict was unquestionably a “ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense,” Evans, and thus an acquittal. Georgia argues that there was no valid verdict pursuant to Georgia law, and thus no acquittal. But whether an acquittal has occurred for double jeopardy purposes is a question of federal law, and a State’s characterization of a ruling is not binding on the Court. Smalis v. Pennsylvania. While States have the power “to regulate procedures under which [their] laws are carried out,” Patterson v. New York, the ultimate question remains whether the Double Jeopardy Clause recognizes an event as an acquittal. The jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity here constituted such a determination, and it is of no moment that the verdict was accompanied by other verdicts appearing to rest on inconsistent findings. An acquittal is an acquittal, even when a jury returns inconsistent verdicts. Bravo-Fernandez. Georgia argues that the bar to second-guessing an acquittal applies only to general verdicts, but the Court’s cases prohibit any speculation about the reasons for a jury’s verdict of acquittal—even when, as here, specific jury findings provide a factual basis for such speculation. To do otherwise “would impermissibly authorize judges to usurp the jury right.” Smith v. United States. " Reversed and Remanded. JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion noting that he believes this decision is limited only to review of an acquittal (as the trial judge found here), but it does not apply when a trial judge refuses to accept an inconsistent verdict at trial. Read by Jake Leahy.

Great Lakes v. Raiders Great Lakes Insurance (organized in Germany and HQ in UK) entered into a maritime insurance contract with Raiders Retreat Realty Company (HQ in PA). The contract included a provision to apply New York law. A Raiders vessel had an incident in Florida, Raiders then filed a claim. Great Lakes filed for declaratory judgment in a Pennsylvania federal court. Raiders responded in that case. The PA federal court applied New York law and denied the Raiders claims under Pennsylvania law. On appeal, the Third Circuit recognized that choice of law provisions in Maritime contracts were presumptively valid, but that there must be a valid public policy reason to allow for it. The Third Circuit remanded back to the federal district court, instructing the court to consider the public policy interests of Pennsylvania in the maritime insurance context. Held: Choice of law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions, not applicable here. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a unanimous court, explains that this strong presumption exists, in part, to support uniformity across maritime law, he reasons that the Court's precedent about venue selection clauses further demonstrates this. Justice Thomas Concurrence. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, but writing that he believed the Court's reliance on Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, 348 US 310 (1955) to be wrongly placed. In that case, Thomas writes, the Court chose to apply state law, rather than applying the presumption about the choice of law provisions, after applying a two-party test, this test asks: “(1) Is there a judicially established federal admiralty rule governing these warranties? (2) If not, should we fashion one?” Id., at 314. Answering both questions in the negative, this Court concluded that state law governs the effect of a breach of warranty in a marine-insurance policy." Although the Court has limited this primarily "local disputes," he cautions that the Court's reasoning in that case is "deeply flawed." Read by Jeff Barnum.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERVICE v. KIRTZ Reginald Kirtz obtained a loan from the Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service. According to Kirtz, the USDA later told one of the major credit agencies (TransUnion) that Kirtz was behind on his payments. Kirtz says this was false and these false statements hurt his credit report and score. He sued the USDA under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The USDA moved to dismiss in District Court because on sovereign immunity grounds. The FCRA defines "person" to include government agencies -- but the statute does not expressly abrogate sovereign immunity otherwise. The District Court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss on these grounds. The Third Circuit reversed. The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether the federal government can be sued for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or if this is precluded on sovereign immunity grounds. Held: A consumer may sue a federal agency for defying the FCRA’s terms. Justice Gorsuch writing for a unanimous Court.

TREVOR MURRAY, PETITIONER v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC, ET AL. As part of Trevor Murray's job at UBS, he had to file reports to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In these reports, he had to certify that the reports reflected his personal and independent views. Despite physical separation from the rest of the unit, Murray claimed that he was receiving pressure from higher ups to skew his reports. He reported these conversations and stated that he thought the pressure was illegal. Evidently during internal discussions, UBS supervisors stated that Murray needed to be either fired or taken off the trading desk. About six weeks after first reporting these concerns, Murray was fired. He sued UBS for retaliatory discharge under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A federal jury ruled for Murray. The jury was not instructed that UBS must have some sort of retaliatory intent. UBS appealed. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing for a new trial with a jury instruction requiring a finding of "retaliatory intent." The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether the statutory language "discriminate against an employee . . . because of ” places the burden on the whistleblower to prove that the employer acted with “retaliatory intent" -- as the Second Circuit held. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the plain language of the not require a proving of this intent. Affirmed. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit split -- whether Deborah Laufer has Article III standing to sue hotels that fail to include information about accessibility accommodations as required by the ADA. She sued hundreds of hotels, most of which she never intended on trying to stay at. After her lawyer faced sanctions, Laufer decided to voluntarily dismiss her case/s. She asked the Supreme Court to vacate her case as moot. Justice Barrett, writing for the Court, agreed. The judgment is vacated and remanded to the First Circuit for dismissal. Read by Jake A. Leahy. Acheson Hotels, LLC. v. Laufer.

In Biden v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the HEROES Act authorized the Secretary of Education to unilaterally forgive $10,000 of student loans for most borrowers. The Court held that the Secretary does not have this power under HEROES Act, despite the language that allows the Secretary to "waive or modify" certain student loan provisions. Read by Jake A. Leahy.